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Abstract
This paper aims to establish guidelines for public pension reform in an aging Japan, using a numerical simulation 
approach. The paper examines the effects of demographic change and public pension policies on economic 
growth and welfare, using a dynamic life-cycle general equilibrium model. It deals with the benchmark case with 
the current Japanese pension schedule based on the 2004 reform, and the reform cases in which the whole basic 
pension beneﬁt is ﬁnanced by a consumption tax and in which the earnings-related pension is abolished. Moreover, 
it handles the case in which a progressive expenditure (or consumption) tax is introduced. The simulation results 
show that the level of economic welfare is higher under these reforms than under the current pension schedule.  
Keywords:  Aging population; Public pension reform; Basic pension; Progressive expenditure tax; Life-cycle 
general equilibrium simulation model
JEL classiﬁcation: H30; C68
1   Introduction
　With a population that is rapidly aging, Japan faces serious public finance problems, particularly when it 
comes to tax and social security issues. Structural reforms are urgently needed to accommodate the impending 
demographic change. In particular, the sustainability of the public pension system is an important problem in 
Japan, and thus a reform of the public pension program was implemented in 2004. However, this reform seems 
to be far from a radical reform. Hence, it was unable to dispel completely the suspicion with which the people, 
especially the young, view the public pension scheme. The necessity for a more drastic reform of the scheme is 
now becoming obvious.
　This paper aims to establish guidelines for public pension and tax reforms in an aging Japan, using a 
numerical simulation approach. This paper examines the effects of different public pension policies on economic 
growth and economic welfare in an aging Japan, using a computable, general equilibrium model of overlapping 
generations. In the benchmark simulation, the public pension reform scheduled by Japan’s 2004 pension reform 
is performed. Alternative simulations with another public pension reform are also implemented. The paper deals 
 
* Correspondence to: Professor, Faculty of Economics, Okayama University,
 Tsushima, Okayama, 700-8530, Japan.
 Phone & Fax: +81-86-251-7539  E-mail: okamoto@e.okayama-u.ac.jp
岡山大学経済学会雑誌 42（２），2010，47 ～ 76
−47−
Akira Okamoto and Toshihiko Shima96
with the simulation case in which the whole basic pension is ﬁnanced by a consumption tax or in which the 
earnings-related pension is abolished. Furthermore, the paper handles the case where a progressive expenditure 
(or consumption) tax replaces a proportional one.
　To analyze the problem, this paper looks at the Japanese tax and social security systems using an extended 
life-cycle general equilibrium model. Many papers have studied using this kind of model; for instance, Auerbach 
and Kotlikoff (1983a, 1983b, 1987), Seidman (1983), Auerbach et al. (1989), Altig et al. (2001), Homma et al. 
(1987), Uemura (2001) and Ihori et al. (2006). Nearly all of them, however, have concentrated on analyzing the 
effects of an aging population on production and consumption1, and thus on economic growth; but when dealing 
with tax and pension reforms it is vital to evaluate not only efﬁciency but also equity.
　There are three themes in this paper.
　First, the paper incorporates three representative households with different earnings abilities in a dynamic 
life-cycle general equilibrium model with an elastic labor supply. This enables us to examine equity issues in 
addition to efﬁciency issues. Thus, this paper considers intra- as well as intergenerational equity, which enables 
us to present some comprehensive and useful guidelines for public pension reforms. The macroeconomic and 
welfare effects of alternative pension policies are evaluated in a transitional process to an aging Japan.
　Second, when dealing with alternative pension reforms, the paper addresses the problems that will actually 
arise in a transitional process of the pension and tax reforms. Concretely, in the reform case in which the 
earnings-related pension is abolished, a transition relief is considered for the generations that have paid 
contributions.
　Third, we take account of a progressive expenditure (or consumption) tax as a source of revenue on public 
pension and tax systems.2 Few studies have dealt with this new type of tax regime to evaluate the effects of 
structural tax reforms. Because there are only a few studies on a progressive expenditure tax, our study has some 
merit as a pioneering work. There are two types of progressive consumption taxes: expenditure tax and sales 
tax. The former deﬁnition, a direct tax that is levied on consumers, is used in our analysis.
　This paper is organized as follows. The next section identiﬁes the basic model employed in the simulation 
analysis. Section 3 explains the method of simulation analysis and the assumptions adopted. Section 4 evaluates 
the simulation ﬁndings and discusses policy implications. Section 5 summarizes and concludes the paper.
2   Theoretical Framework
　The life-cycle growth model employed in this paper is grounded in the microeconomics of intertemporal 
choice, and the macroeconomics of savings and growth. The simulation model has three features. First, 
aggregate assets of the economy in each period consist of the assets of different generations that maximize their 
lifetime utility. This allows us to rigorously analyze changes in the supply of assets caused by demographic 
changes. Second, assets in the capital market, where aggregate assets appear as real capital, affect the production 
level. Third, it is possible to estimate realistic consumption-savings proﬁles for the elderly, by incorporating life-
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length uncertainty and unintended bequests into the model.
　We calibrate the simulation of the Japanese economy by employing population data estimated by the 
National Institute of Population and Social Security Research in 2006. The model has 75 different overlapping 
generations. Three types of agents are considered: households, ﬁrms, and the government. The basic structures 
of households, firms, and the government are first described, and then market equilibrium conditions are 
explained.
2.1   Household Behavior
　Each household is assumed to consist of a couple of the same age. Each household appears in the economy as 
a decision-making unit at the age of 21 and lives to a maximum of 95. Younger people than age 21 do not affect 
the economy at all. Households face an age-dependent probability of death. Let  qtj+1 | j  be the conditional 
probability that a household born in year  t  lives from age  j  to  j+1. Then the probability of a household of age 
21, born in year  t, surviving until  s   can be expressed by
　　　  (1)
　The probability  qtj+1 | j  is calculated from data estimated by the National Institute of Population and Social 
Security Research (2007).
　Households are divided into three income classes: low, medium, and high. A single household type represents 
each income class. The household that belongs to the same cohort has the same mortality rate and the same 
utility function. Unequal labor endowments, however, create different income levels. The utility of each 
household depends on the levels of consumption and leisure. The household born in year  t  works from age 21 
to a maximum of  RE t, the retirement age. The labor supply is elastic but zero after retirement. Each household 
that maximizes the expected lifetime utility makes lifetime decisions at age 21, concerning the choice between 
leisure and labor supply and the allocation of wealth between consumption and savings. The utility function of a 
representative household of income class  i, the form of which is assumed to be time-separable, is
　　　  (2)
where  Ct, is   and  l
t, i
s   represent consumption (or expenditure) and leisure, respectively, for income class  i, of 
age  s, born in year  t ,  φ  the share parameter for consumption,  δ  the adjustment coefﬁcient for discounting 
the future, and  r  the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in the consumption/leisure composite. The 
superscript i (=l, m, h)  stands for low, medium, and high-income classes, respectively.
　The ﬂow budget constraint equation for each household at age  s  at time  t  is
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　　　　　　  (3)
where  At, is   represents the amount of assets held by income class  i  born in year  t  at the beginning of age  s,  rt 
the interest rate at time  t,  wt  the wage rate per efﬁciency unit of labor at time  t, and  es   is the age proﬁle of 
earnings ability. For income class  i, of age  s, born in year  t,  1− l t, is   is the amount of labor supply, 
  is the amount of public pension benefit, and  a t, is   is the amount of bequest to be inherited. 
  is the tax rate on labor income at time  t,   that on consumption at time  t ,  τr   that on 
capital income, and  τ pt   is the contribution rate to the public pension scheme at time  t.  x
i  is the weight 
coefﬁcient corresponding to the different levels of labor endowments across the three income classes.
　The tax system consists of labor income, interest income, consumption, and inheritance taxes. Labor income 
or consumption (i.e., expenditure) is taxed progressively. The progressive tax schedule is incorporated in the 
same manner as in Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987). If the tax base is  z, we choose two parameters labeled 
α  and  β, and set the average tax rate (τw or τc) equal to  α＋ 0.5βz  for all values of  z. The corresponding 
marginal tax rate (τ
−
w or τ
−
c) is  α＋ βz. Setting  β = 0  amounts to proportional taxation. One may make the tax 
system more progressive, holding revenue constant, by increasing  β  and decreasing  α  simultaneously.
　Progressive taxation is applied to the gross wage or the level of consumption on an annual basis for 
households. In the case of progressive labor income taxation, the tax base,  z, is the gross wage,  . 
If progressive expenditure (or consumption) taxation is adopted,  z is the level of expenditure (or consumption), 
Ct, is . The symbols,    and  , in equation (3) mean that  τ
w  and  τc  are functions of 
  and  Ct, is , respectively. The tax systems on interest income and inheritances are proportional.
　The public pension program is assumed to be a pay-as-you-go system that is close to the current Japanese 
system. The program consists of the basic pension (i.e., the flat part) and a part proportional to the average 
annual income from labor for each household. Variables related to the program are represented by
　　　  (4)
where
　　　  (5)
　STt is the age at which the household born in year  t  starts to receive public pension beneﬁt, the average 
annual income from labor for each income class is  , the basic pension beneﬁt per representative 
household is  ft, and the weight coefﬁcient of the part proportional to  H
t, i  is  θt. Thus,    reﬂects 
different earnings abilities across the three income classes. The symbol,  , signiﬁes that the amount 
of public pension beneﬁt is a function of the age proﬁle of leisure,  .
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　There are accidental bequests caused by uncertainty over the length of life. The bequests, which were held as 
assets by deceased households, are handed to all households surviving at time  t. The inheritance is transferred 
within the same income class. When  BQis   is the sum of bequests inherited by  s-year-old households of income 
class  i  at time  t,  at, is   is deﬁned by
　　　  (6)
where
　　　  (7)
　N t, is   is the number of income class  i , of age s, born in year  t, and τ
h is the tax rate on inheritances of 
bequests. The amount of inheritances received is linked to the age proﬁle of assets chosen by each household.
　When we consider the utility maximization problem over time for each income class, in addition to the ﬂow 
budget constraint represented by equation (3), the following constraint is imposed:
　　　  (8)
　This is a constraint that labor supply is nonnegative, and that each household invariably retires after the 
retirement age  REt.
　Let us consider the case in which each household maximizes expected lifetime utility under two constraints. 
Each household maximizes equation (2) subject to equations (3) and (8) (see Appendix A). From the utility 
maximization problem, the equation expressing evolutions of the consumption/leisure composite over time for 
each household is characterized by
　　　  (9)
where
　　　  (10)
　If the initial level,  Vt, i21  , is speciﬁed, the level of each age,  V
t, i
s , can be derived from equation (9). If  V
t, i
s   is 
speciﬁed, the levels of consumption,  Ct, is , and leisure,  l
t, i
s , at each age are obtained. The amount of assets 
held by each household at each age can be obtained from equation (3). The expected lifetime utility of each 
household is derived from equation (2).
　The welfare function of each generation, which takes account of different earnings abilities and thus provides 
different levels of consumption and leisure, is given by
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　　　  (11)
　This function is derived from a summation of the expected lifetime utilities at age 21 for the three income 
classes. The function is of the “Benthamite type,” but depends greatly on the utility of the low-income class. It 
is maximized if all income classes have the same level of the consumption/leisure composite.
　Empirical evaluation of each simulation from Case B to E in comparison with the benchmark Case A is made 
by the following formulation of  RWCt (relative welfare changes by percentage ﬁgures):
　　　  (12)
where  UtA  signiﬁes the lifetime utility for the generation born in year  t  in Case A, and  U
t
J   (J = B, C, D, E) 
represents the lifetime utility for the generation born in year  t  in each simulation case. The minus sign was 
added so that improvements in  RWCt   show positive numerical changes in welfare.
2.2   Firm Behavior
　The model has a single production sector that is assumed to behave competitively using capital and labor, 
subject to a constant-returns-to-scale production function. Capital is homogeneous and depreciating, while labor 
differs only in its efﬁciency. All forms of labor are perfect substitutes. Households in different income classes or 
of different ages, however, supply different amounts of some standard measure per unit of labor input.
　The aggregate production technology is the standard Cobb-Douglas form:
　　　  (13)
where  Yt  is the total output (national income),  Kt  the total capital,  Lt  the total labor supply measured by the 
efﬁciency units,  Bt the labor augmenting technology, and  ε  is a share of capital. Using the property subject to a 
constant-returns-to-scale production function, we can obtain the following equation:
　　　  (14)
where  δk  is the depreciation rate.
2.3   Government Behavior
　The government sector consists of a narrower government sector and a public pension sector. The narrower 
government sector collects taxes, and spends them on general government expenditure and a transfer to the 
pension sector. The budget constraint of the narrower government sector at time  t  is given by
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　　　  (15)
where  Dt  is the stock of outstanding debt at the beginning of year  t,  Gt is general government spending on 
goods and services, except for a transfer to the public pension sector,  Ft  is the total amount of basic pension 
beneﬁt, and  μt  is the ratio of the part covered by general tax revenues to  Ft,  Tt  is the total tax revenue from 
labor income, interest income, consumption, and inheritances.
　The budget constraint of the public pension sector at time  t  is given by
　　　  (16)
where  Qt  is an accumulated public pension fund at the beginning of year  t,  Rt  is the total contribution to the 
pension program, and  Pt  is the total beneﬁt of the part proportional to the income from labor.  Gt,  Tt,  Ft,  Rt, 
and  Pt  are deﬁned by
　　　  (17)
　　　  (18)
　　　  (19)
　　　  (20)
　　　  (21)
where  g  is the ratio of government expenditure to national income,  ft  is the total basic pension to national 
income,  I  is an indicator function, and
　　　  (22)
　LXt  and  CXt  are tax revenues from labor income and consumption, respectively:
　　　  (23)
　　　  (24)
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　Aggregate variables can be obtained by a simple summation of the three income classes with the same 
weight, because each income group accounts for the same proportion of population. Similarly, aggregate assets 
supplied by households,  ASt,  and aggregate consumption,  ACt, are obtained by
　　　  (25)
　　　  (26)
2.4   Market Equilibrium
　Finally, equilibrium conditions for the capital, labor, and goods markets are described.
1   Equilibrium condition for the capital market
　Because aggregate assets supplied by households are equal to real capital, we get
　　　  (27)
2   Equilibrium condition for the labor market
　Measured in efﬁciency units, because aggregate labor demand by ﬁrms is equal to aggregate labor supply by 
households, we get
　　　  (28)
3   Equilibrium condition for the goods market
　Because aggregate production is equal to the sum of private consumption, private investment, and government 
expenditures, we get
　　　  (29)
　An iterative program is performed to obtain the equilibrium values of the above equations.
3   Simulation Analysis
3.1   Method of Simulation
　The simulation model presented in the previous section is solved under the hypothesis of perfect foresight by 
households that correctly anticipate the interest, wage, tax, and contribution rates. If the tax and public pension 
systems are determined, the model can be solved using the Gauss-Seidel method (see Auerbach and Kotlikoff 
(1987) or Heer and Maußner (2005) for the computation process).
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　This paper deals with the Japanese transitional economy, considering the initial steady state in 2008 and 
the ﬁnal steady state in 2200. With regard to the generations that are alive in the 2008 initial steady state and 
continue to survive in 2009, we should pay attention to their formation of the expectation for the future. These 
generations realize at the point in 2009 that their expectation from 2009 onwards has been wrong. Thus, again in 
2009, they maximize their remaining lifetime utility under the hypothesis of perfect foresight.
3.2   Simulation Cases
　In the benchmark simulation, the public pension reform scheduled by Japan’s 2004 pension reform is 
performed. Alternative simulations with another public pension and tax reform are also considered. We ﬁrstly 
deal with the reform case in which the whole basic pension is ﬁnanced by a consumption tax. Then we deal 
with the case in which the earnings-related pension is abolished and the public pension system consists of 
only the basic pension ﬁnanced by a consumption tax. In this respect, we can interpret that this case means the 
integration of public pension and tax systems. Finally, we explore a desirable source of revenue on the integrated 
public pension and tax systems. We handle the case in which a progressive expenditure (or consumption) tax is 
introduced.
　With regard to the setting of the simulation cases, we make the total amount of public pension benefit in 
each year ﬁxed across cases to eliminate the effects of different pension size on the simulation results. The total 
amount of public pension beneﬁt in each year in Cases B, C, D and E is adjusted to be the same as in Case A: 
In Case B the contribution rate in each year is reduced, while in Cases C, D, and E the amount of basic pension 
beneﬁt in each year is increased. We consider ﬁve simulation cases (see Figure 1 for diagrams of the public 
Figure 1  Diagrams of public pension system in each simulation case
Earnings-related 
pension
Case A Cases C, D, and E 
Basic pension
Case B
Earnings-related 
pension 
Basic pension 
Basic pension 
A shadow area shows the part ﬁnanced by taxes. 
Case A: Benchmark simulation, Case B: Basic pension ﬁnanced by consumption tax
Case C: No earnings-related pension, Case D: Proportional expenditure tax
Case E: Progressive expenditure tax
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pension system in each simulation case):
1)  Case A (Benchmark simulation)
　The public pension schedule by Japan’s 2004 pension reform is implemented up to 2200. The general tax 
revenue covers a little more than one third (i.e., 37.3%) of the basic pension in the public pension system in 
2008.3 From 2009 onwards it is raised to a half according to the pension plan. The rise in the basic pension by 
about one sixth is assumed to be ﬁnanced by a consumption tax. The contribution rate to the public pension 
scheme is the actual rate of 15.35% in employee pension plans (Kosei Nenkin) in 2008 and increases gradually 
towards 2017 (see Table 1 for the contribution rate in each year). From 2017 onwards, the rate is ﬁxed at the 
18.30% level. The balance of the pension fund undergoes a transition until 2100 along the schedule by the 2004 
reform.
2)  Case B (Basic pension ﬁnanced by a consumption tax)
　In Case A, from 2009 onwards the remaining half of the basic pension is ﬁnanced by a consumption tax. 
Thus, from 2009 onwards the overall basic pension beneﬁt is ﬁnanced by a consumption tax.4 The earnings-
related pension remains to be ﬁnanced by contributions. We consider the substitution from contributions (which 
mean a proportional labor income tax) to a consumption tax in a half of the basic pension.
3)  Case C (No earnings-related pension)
　In Case B, the earnings-related pension is completely abolished in 2009. From 2009 onwards, the public 
pension system consists of only a basic pension ﬁnanced by a consumption tax.5 In other words, from 2009 
onwards the whole public pension beneﬁt is ﬁnanced by a consumption tax and the contribution rates become 
zero. A transition relief is considered for the generations that have paid contributions.
Table 1   Contribution rates in the benchmark simulation
Year Contribution rates (τpt )
2008 15.35%
2009 15.704%
2010 16.058%
2011 16.412%
2012 16.766%
2013 17.12%
2014 17.474%
2015 17.828%
2016 18.182%
2017 — 18.3%
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4)  Case D (Proportional expenditure tax)
　In Case C, from 2009 onward a proportional expenditure (or consumption) tax finances the overall tax 
revenue. Labor income, capital income, and the inheritance of bequests are not taxed. All tax systems become 
proportional, and thus there is not the income redistribution through a tax system.
5)  Case E (Progressive expenditure tax)
　In Case D, from 2009 onwards a progressive expenditure (or consumption) tax replaces a proportional one. 
This reform enables to perform the income redistribution through a tax system. 
　Case B deals with the substitution from contributions (which mean a proportional labor income tax) to a 
proportional consumption tax. In Case B the whole basic pension is ﬁnanced by a consumption tax. In Case C 
the earnings-related pension is completely abolished, and the amount of the basic pension is increased. This 
increase strengthens income redistribution effects through a public pension scheme. 
　Cases D and E are extreme cases to explore guidelines for public pension and tax reforms. Case D deals 
with the complete shift to a proportional expenditure (or consumption) tax. Case D does not have the function 
of income redistribution through a tax system. Due to perform the function of income redistribution, Case E 
introduces a progressive expenditure (or consumption) tax (see Appendixes B and C for the concrete method of 
the introduction of a progressive expenditure tax).
　In Cases C, D, and E, the earnings-related pension system is completely abolished from 2009 onwards. 
However, as a transition relief, the generations that have paid contributions until 2008 can receive the earnings-
related pension until they die. The amount of the earnings-related pension benefit is proportional to the 
contributions paid. In Cases C, D, and E, the average annual income from labor for income class  i  born in year 
t (t ≤ 1987)  is 
　　　  (5)’
　In Cases C, D, and E, equation (5)’ replaces equation (5). With regard to the weight coefﬁcient on the average 
annual income from labor for each income class,  θt, the values in Case B are applied for Cases C, D, and E.
3.3   Speciﬁcation of Parameters
　This paper examines the implications of several public pension policies in an aging Japan. We choose 
parameter values that are realistic for the economy. Parameter values are assigned with reference to empirical 
research, such as Braun et al. (2005, 2009), Hayashi and Prescott (2002), and Nishiyama and Smetters (2005). 
The parameter values used in the benchmark simulation are given in Table 2.
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1   Demography
　Actual population data are used from 2008 to 2200 in a transitional process. With regard to population 
projections until 2200, we employ the “medium variant” data from the National Institute of Population and 
Social Security Research (2007). Because the data gives estimates of the future population only until 2105, the 
number of births and deaths and survival rates after 2105 until 2200 are assumed to be ﬁxed at their 2105 levels. 
The percentage of the population of each age in the total population in the simulation equals the value based on 
this data. Survival probabilities  (pts )  are also calculated from the data. Our model makes no distinction by sex, 
and thus this study uses male–female average values.
2   Age proﬁle of labor efﬁciency
　With regard to the age proﬁle of earnings ability,  es, the data was obtained from Braun et al. (2005, 2009). 
The labor efﬁciency proﬁle is constructed from Japanese data on employment, wages, and weekly hours from 
1990 to 2000 (see the data appendix in Braun et al. (2005)).
3   Government deﬁcits
　The ratio of the outstanding government debt to GDP is assumed to be 107.2% in 2008 in the simulation, 
making reference to the Ministry of Finance (2008). We assume that the ratio of the public debt to GDP tends 
to decrease gradually from 2008 through 2200, as shown in Figure 2 (which presents the ratio until 2100). The 
movement of the decrease is connected with the decrease in the ratio of pension fund to GDP. 
4   Taxes and expenditures
　The progressive tax system on labor income in 2008 is fixed until 2200. Tax rates on capital income and 
Table 2   Model calibration and data sources for exogenous variables
Parameter description Parameter values Data sources
Share parameter for consumption φ = 0.5
Nishiyama and Smetters 
(2005): φ = 0.47
Adjustment coefﬁcient for discounting the future δ = - 0.013
Intertemporal substitution elasticity γ = 0.3 Altig et al. (2001): γ = 0.25
Capital share in production ε = 0.362 Hayashi and Prescott (2002)
Depreciation rate δk = 0.0759 Braun et al. (2005, 2009)
Parameters on a progressive labor income tax (Case A, B, and C)
αw = 0.0423,
 βw = 0.1747 
Parameters on a progressive expenditure tax (Case E) βc = 0.63
Tax rate on capital income (Case A, B, and C) τr = 0.48 Hayashi and Prescott (2002)
Tax rate on inheritance (Case A, B, and C) τh = 0.1 Ihori et al. (2006)
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inheritance are also held constant at the 2008 levels (namely, 48% and 10%, respectively) through time.6 A 
consumption tax is endogenously determined to keep certain tax revenue. Because our model does not introduce 
such taxes as corporate and property ones, tax rates on consumption are likely to take higher values than actual 
ones. It should be also noted that the consumption tax in our model means an indirect tax.
　The ratio of the general government expenditures to national income,  g, is held constant at the 2008 level (i.e., 
0.02239) through time. Thus the total government expenditure,  Gt, depends on the level of national income, Yt. 
The ratio of outstanding government debt to GDP,  Dt, is exogenously given in our simulation. Therefore, the 
tax rate on consumption is endogenous in our simulation.
　Next, we explain the method of assigning the parameter values that determine the tax progressivity on labor 
income, namely,  αw  and  βw. Table 3 shows the data from the Ministry of Finance (2007). This table presents 
the effective tax rates of wageworkers on a national income tax and a residence tax for the three income classes, 
with regard to a couple with two children. The parameter values on labor income are chosen so that the effective 
0
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1.2
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2008 2018 2028 2038 2048 2058 2068 2078 2088 2098
Year
Public debt/GDP
Figure 2  Changes of the ratio of public debt to GDP
Table 3   Effective tax rates for national income tax and residence tax of wageworkers
Income class
Total amount of annual 
income  (million yen)
Weight on labor 
endowments
Total amount of annual taxes: national income 
tax and residence tax  (thousand yen)
Effective tax rates 
(%)
Low 5 xl = 0.7143 195 3.90
Medium 7 x = 1 459 6.56
High 10 xh = 1.4286 1,130 11.30
Data given are for a couple with two children.
Source: Ministry of Finance (2008).
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tax rate for each income class in 2008 in Case A is close to the estimated value, and that the average tax rate on 
labor income is close to the value calculated from this data (i.e., 8.11%).
　Finally, we explain the method of assigning the parameter values that determine the tax progressivity on 
expenditure, namely,  αct   and  β
c, in Case E. The parameter of the part proportional to the level of consumption, 
βc, is exogenously given, and thus the parameter of the constant part,  αct   is endogenously determined in each 
year.
5   Public Pension System
　The public pension program is assumed to be a pay-as-you-go system that is close to the current Japanese 
system. The public pension beneﬁt consists of a basic pension (i.e., a ﬂat part) and a part proportional to the 
income from labor for each income class. Under the current Japanese system, the general tax revenue covers a 
little more than one third of the ﬂat part, and contributions cover both the remaining two thirds and the overall 
part proportional to the income from labor. The Japanese government aims to raise the ratio from 0.373 in 2008 
to a half in 2009.
　The ratio of the total amount of basic pension beneﬁt  (Ft)  to GDP  (Yt), i.e.,  f, is determined so that the 
ratio in each simulation is the ratio presented in the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare (2008) (see Figure 
3 for further details of the ratio). Thus, the ratio  ( f t)  is exogenously given in each year until 2200. From 2100 
onwards the ratio in 2100 is used and constant up to 2200.
　In Case A, the public pension reform scheduled by Japan’s 2004 reform is executed until 2105. The ratio of 
Figure 3  Changes of the ratio of basic pension to GDP
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the public pension fund to GDP in 2008 is 31.6%, namely the ratio suggested by the Ministry of Health, Labor 
and Welfare (2008). The public pension fund will be gradually diminishing up to 2200, as shown in Figure 4 
(which presents the ratio until 2100).
　The contribution rate, the public pension fund, and the basic pension beneﬁt per household are exogenous in 
each year. Thus, the weight coefﬁcient  (θt)  on the earnings-related pension is endogenous in each year. When 
the whole basic pension is ﬁnanced by a consumption tax in Case B, the contribution rate  (τpt )  is exogenously 
decreased. The contribution rates in Case B are reduced or the ratios of the total amount of basic pension beneﬁt 
to GDP are increased in Cases C, D, and E, so that the total amount of public pension beneﬁt in each year is the 
same as in Case A. 
　The age at which households start to receive public pension beneﬁts,  STt, is different across generations, 
because it has been modified by several public pension reforms in Japan. The starting age,  STt, for each 
generation in the simulation is shown in Table 4. The compulsory retirement age,  REt, is the starting age of 
Table 4  The starting age for receiving public pension beneﬁts
The year when the generation was born Starting age for receiving public pension beneﬁts (STt)
　　 — 1954 60
1955 — 1957 61
1958 — 1959 62
1960 — 1961 63
1962 — 1965 64
1966 — 　　 65
0
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Figure 4  Changes of the ratio of pension fund to GDP
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public pension beneﬁts, STt, minus one.
6   Differences in Earnings Abilities
　Next, we explain the method of assigning the weight given to labor endowments for the three income classes. 
In our model, the three representative households, namely, low, medium, and high-income classes, have different 
earnings abilities. Table 3 shows that each income class, which accounts for one third of the total population, 
corresponds to the representative household earning 5, 7, or 10 million yen, respectively, on an annual base. The 
weight on labor endowments for each income class corresponds to the ratio of its amount of earned income. The 
medium-income class is used as a yardstick, that is,  xm  = 1 ; xl   and  xh  are assigned to reﬂect different earnings 
abilities across the three income classes.
7   Share Parameter on Consumption in Utility
　We assign the value of the share parameter on consumption in the utility function, with reference to Auerbach 
and Kotlikoff (1987) and Altig et al. (2001). We choose the value such that, on average, the medium-income 
class devotes approximately 40% of the available time endowment (of 16 hours per day) to labor during 
working years (roughly ages 21-61) in 2008 in Case A.
8   Technological Progress
　The technological progress of private production plays a significant role because it greatly affects the 
economic growth. Thus, careful attention should be paid to the assumption on technological progress. The 
growth rate of labor augmenting technology is assumed to be zero in our simulation, reflecting Japan’s 
experience for the last two decades, as in Ihori et al. (2006),
4   Simulation Results
　Table 5 presents the simulation results on the initial steady state in 2008. In 2009, alternative public pension 
and tax reforms are implemented in all simulation cases. The generations that are alive in the 2008 initial steady 
state and continue to survive in 2009, realize in 2009 that their expectation from 2009 onwards has been wrong. 
Hence, again in 2009, they maximize their remaining lifetime utility under the hypothesis of perfect foresight. 
We evaluate their utility by their ex post lifetime utility at age 21.
4.1   Findings and Policy Implications
　Table 6 presents the simulation results on the benchmark case and four public pension and tax reforms, which 
corresponds to Case A and Cases B, C, D, and E, respectively. This table shows variables of interest for four 
transition years─2009, 2020, 2050, and 2100─meant to illustrate short-run, medium-run, and long-run effects. 
Some variables are indexed with a value of 1.000 for each year in benchmark simulation (i.e., Case A).
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Case A: Benchmark simulation
　In Case A, the public pension reform scheduled by the 2004 reform plan is implemented.
　The ratio of the part ﬁnanced by taxes to the basic pension,  μt, is raised from 37.3% in 2008 to 50% in 2009. 
The source of revenue is a consumption tax. The contribution rates gradually increase as shown in Table 1. 
The public pension fund tends to gradually decrease as shown in Figure 4. In short-run, the interest rate once 
increases from 2.8% in 2009 to 6.7% in 2020. However, afterwards the interest rate tends to decrease, and 
ultimately drops to 1.7% in 2100. A possible reason for this is that we have more capital than labor, as Japan 
ages. In the short-run, the indirect tax rate increases from 11.6% in 2009 to 12.7% in 2020. The rate increases up 
to 20.6% in 2050, but it gets settled to 15.0% in the long-run.
Case B: Basic pension ﬁnanced by consumption tax
　In Case B, from 2009 onwards the overall basic pension is ﬁnanced by a consumption tax. The contribution 
rate in each year in Case B is reduced so that the total amount of public pension beneﬁt in each year in Case B is 
the same as in Case A. Thus, we can understand that Case B deals with the substitution from contributions (which 
mean a proportional labor income tax) to a proportional consumption tax. The substitution promotes capital 
accumulation. Table 6 suggests that the level of capital stock increases in the conversion from Case A to B. In 
the switch from Case A to B, the capital stock increases by 3.8% in 2020 and by 4.9% in 2100. The labor supply 
also increases slightly by 0.9% in 2020 and by 0.3% in 2100. As a result, the national income increases by 1.9% 
in 2020 and by 2.0% in 2100.
　Figure 5 presents the welfare changes for each generation in switching from Case A to B. The welfare for 
the generation born in from 1972 onwards is improved. In the long run it is improved by 0.8%. However, 
with regard to the generations born in from 1938 to 1971, the welfare is deteriorated. A possible reason for 
Table 5   Simulation results in the initial steady state in 2008
Parameter description Parameter values
Tax rate on labor income,  
 
0.082a
Tax rate on consumption,  τc 0.167
Ratio of part ﬁnanced by taxes to the basic pension,  μ 0.373 b
Contribution rate,  τp 0.1535
b
Interest rate,  r 0.026
Wage rate,  w 1.313
Capital stock,  K 6.798
Labor supply,  L 0.925
National income,  Y 1.903
Capital-income ratio,  K/Y 3.571
Weight coefﬁcient on earnings-related pension,  θ 0.1916
a  The tax rate is progressive, and an average rate is presented.
b  The variable is exogenous.
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Table 6  Simulation results on public pension reforms
Case 2009 2020 2050 2100
National
Income (Yt)
a
A 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
B 1.002 1.019 1.021 1.020
C 1.052 1.124 1.114 1.146
D 1.087 1.280 1.256 1.319
E 1.020 1.190 1.196 1.246
Capital
Stock (Kt)
a
A 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
B 0.996 1.038 1.050 1.049
C 1.047 1.237 1.266 1.372
D 1.070 1.630 1.576 1.788
E 1.052 1.535 1.555 1.738
Labor supply (Lt)
a
A 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
B 1.005 1.009 1.006 1.003
C 1.055 1.064 1.037 1.035
D 1.096 1.115 1.104 1.109
E 1.002 1.029 1.031 1.031
Wage rate (Wt)
a
A 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
B 0.997 1.010 1.016 1.017
C 1.295 1.141 1.499 1.531
D 0.991 1.147 1.137 1.189
E 1.018 1.156 1.160 1.208
Interest rate (rt)
A 0.028 0.067 0.015 0.017
B 0.028 0.064 0.013 0.014
C 0.028 0.054 0.004 0.002
D 0.029 0.036 0.000 0.000
E 0.024 0.035 0.000 0.000
Indirect tax rate
(Tax rate on consumption)
( τct )
A 0.116 0.127 0.206 0.150
B 0.135 0.143 0.239 0.175
C 0.126 0.237 0.407 0.380
D 0.269 0.380 0.531 0.491
E b 0.109 0.383 0.537 0.500
a  Indexed with a value of 1.000 for each year in Case A.
Case A: Benchmark simulation, Case B: Basic pension ﬁnanced by consumption tax
Case C: No earnings-related pension, Case D: Proportional expenditure tax
Case E: Progressive expenditure tax
b  The tax rate is progressive, and the rate presented is an average rate in each year.
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this is that the tax rate on consumption is higher in Case B than in Case A: For example, the rate is 12.7% in 
Case A and 14.3% in Case B in 2020. A change from a labor income tax to a consumption tax creates income 
transfers among generations during the transition. At the onset of policy reform, the elderly who had already 
paid their labor income tax have to pay an additional consumption tax. Because these generations suffer from a 
double burden, the transition to a consumption tax is not Pareto improving. The conclusion that recommends a 
consumption tax will be required to provide further justiﬁcation, that is, to suggest measures to avoid a double 
burden during the transition. One of the solutions to this problem may be to consider the transfer from the future 
generations that are substantially improved to the generations that suffer from a double burden, through public 
debts. 
　Figure 6 presents the changes in the utility for each income class in switching from Case A to B. The ﬁgure 
suggests that the pension reform in Case B has a similar effect on the three income classes.
Case C: No earnings-related pension
　In Case B the earnings-related pension is completely abolished in 2009, which produces Case C. From 
2009 onwards, the public pension system consists of only the basic pension ﬁnanced by a consumption tax. 
In other words, from 2009 onwards the whole public pension beneﬁt is ﬁnanced by a consumption tax and the 
contribution rates become zero. The amount of basic pension beneﬁt in each year in Case C is increased so 
that the total amount of public pension beneﬁt in each year in Case C is the same as in Case A. An increase in 
the basic pension in Case C strengthens the income redistribution effect through a public pension scheme. 
　A transition relief is considered for the generations that are alive in the 2008 initial steady state and 
Figure 5  Changes in welfare for each generation in Cases B, C, D, and E
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continue to survive in 2009. The generations that have paid contributions until 2008 can receive the earnings-
related pension until they die. The amount of the earnings-related pension beneﬁt is proportional to the paid 
contributions. The weight coefﬁcients given on the earnings-related pension,  θt, are the same as in Case B.
　This pension reform substantially stimulates capital accumulation. Table 6 shows that the level of capital stock 
substantially increases in the conversion from Case A to C. In the switch from Case A to C, the capital stock 
increases by 23.7% in 2020 and by 37.2% in 2100. A possible reason for this is that in Case C a consumption 
tax completely replaces a contribution rate, and thus a whole pension beneﬁt is ﬁnanced by a consumption tax. 
A consumption tax enhances more capital accumulation than a contribution rate (which means a labor income 
tax). The labor supply also increases by 6.4% in 2020 and by 3.5% in 2100. Consequently, the national income 
increases by 12.4% in 2020 and by 14.6% in 2100. Therefore, the simulation results predict long-run increases 
in output when the public pension system consists of only the basic pension, which is ﬁnanced by a consumption 
tax.
　Figure 5 presents the welfare changes for each generation in switching from Case A to C. The welfare for 
the generations born in from 1978 onwards is substantially improved. In the long run it is improved by 5.6%. 
However, with regard to the generations born in from 1955 to 1977, the welfare is deteriorated. Especially, 
the welfare for the generations born in around 1965 is deteriorated by approximately 5%. It is certain that the 
welfare of many generations is ultimately more improved in Case C than in Case B, but the welfare for the 
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generations born in around 1965 is more badly hurt in the transition process of the reform in Case C.
　A possible reason for this is that the tax rate on consumption is much higher in Case C than in Case B: For 
instance, the rate is 14.3% in Case B and 23.7% in Case C in 2020. A change from a labor income tax to a 
consumption tax generates income transfers among generations during the transition. At the onset of policy 
reform, the elderly who had already paid their labor income tax have to pay an additional consumption tax. 
Thus, these generations suffer from a double burden. 
　Figure 5 shows that, in the switch from Case A to C, the welfare for the generations born in from 1915 to 
1954 is also improved. One of the reasons for this would be that this paper takes account of a transition relief for 
the generations that have paid contributions. 
　Figure 7 presents the changes in the utility for each income class in switching from Case A to C. The 
ﬁgure suggests that the pension reform has a different effect among the three income classes. The degree of 
improvement of the utility is greater for the low income class, while for the high income class it is smaller. 
In the long run, the utility for the low income class is improved by 8.6%, but for the high income class it is 
ameliorated by only 1.1%. The utility for the low income class turns to be improved for the generations born 
in from 1975 onwards, while that for the high income class turns to be improved for those born in from 1984 
onwards. A possible reason for this is that the basic pension is substantially increased in Case C, and thus it 
strengthens the income redistribution effect through a public pension scheme.
Figure 7  Changes in utility for each income class in Case C
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Case D: Proportional expenditure tax
　Finally, we explore a desirable source of revenue on the integrated public pension and tax systems. In Case 
C, from 2009 onward a proportional expenditure (or consumption) tax ﬁnances the overall tax revenue, which 
yields Case D. Labor income, capital income, and inheritance of bequests are not taxed. All tax systems become 
proportional, and thus there is not the income redistribution through a tax system.
　Table 6 shows that the complete shift to a proportional expenditure (or consumption) tax substantially 
enhances both capital accumulation and labor supply, resulting in a high level of national income. In switching 
from Case A to D, the capital stock dramatically increases by 63.0% in 2020 and by 78.8% in 2100. The labor 
supply also increases by 11.5% in 2020 and by 10.9% in 2100. As a result, the national income substantially 
increases by 28.0% in 2020 and by 31.9% in 2100. Therefore, when the ratio of tax revenue from consumption 
to total tax revenue is high, capital accumulation is substantially promoted. The tax reform in Case D generates 
favorable results with regard to efﬁciency.
　Figure 5 presents the welfare changes for each generation in switching from Case A to D. The welfare 
for the generations born in from 1970 onwards is higher in Case D than in Case C. However, with regard to 
the generations born in from 1950 to 1975, the welfare is deteriorated compared to Case A. Especially, the 
generations born in around 1960s are badly worse off in Case D than in Case C.
　Figure 8 presents the changes in the utility for each income class in switching from Case A to D. This ﬁgure 
suggests that, with regard to the generations born in from 1971 onwards, the utility is improved for the high 
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Figure 8  Changes in utility for each income class in Case D
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income class more than for the low and medium income classes. Due to the absence of income redistribution 
through a tax system in Case D, the low income class is relatively worse off, while the high income class is 
relatively better off. Thus, the tax reform in Case D does not create favorable results with regard to equity.
Case E: Progressive expenditure tax
　Because of the absence of the function of income redistribution through a tax system, Case D could 
not produce favorable results with regard to equity. To solve the problem, a progressive expenditure (or 
consumption) tax is introduced in Case D, which yields Case E. Case E examines the effects of the introduction 
of a progressive expenditure tax on efﬁciency and equity.
　Table 6 shows that, with regard to efﬁciency, Case E is slightly inferior to Case D. The levels of the capital 
stock, labor supply, and national income are lower in Case E than in Case D. In switching from Case A to E, 
the capital stock substantially increases by 53.5% in 2020 and by 73.8% in 2100. However, the labor supply 
increases by only 2.9% in 2020 and by only 3.1% in 2100. As a result, the national income increases by 19.0% 
in 2020 and by 24.6% in 2100.
　Figure 5 presents the welfare changes for each generation in switching from Case A to E. With regard to 
the generations born in from 1972 onwards, Case E with a progressive expenditure tax attains the highest 
level of welfare among all reform cases presented in this paper. In addition, in switching from Case A to E, the 
generations born in around 1960s are worse off in Case E less than in Case D in the transition process of the 
Figure 9  Changes in utility for each income class in Case E
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reform.
　Figure 9 presents the changes in the utility for each income class in switching from Case A to E. This 
ﬁgure shows that, with regard to all generations born in from 1913 to 2100, the utility is improved for the low 
income class more than for the medium income class. And, the utility is improved for the high income class 
less than for the medium income class with regard to all generations. This result suggests that the introduction 
of a progressive expenditure tax provides strong income redistribution, which enhances the welfare of the 
generations.
　Therefore, the simulation results show that the introduction of a progressive expenditure tax not only may 
promote economic growth substantially but also may mitigate intragenerational inequality efﬁciently, resulting 
in a high economic welfare.
5   Conclusions
　This paper examined guidelines for public pension and tax reforms in an aging Japan, using a dynamic life-
cycle general equilibrium simulation model with different labor endowments. The paper examined the effects 
of demographic change and public pension and tax policies on economic growth and welfare. It evaluated 
the benchmark case scheduled by the 2004 reform, the case in which the whole basic pension is financed 
by a consumption tax, the case in which the earnings-related pension is abolished, and the case in which a 
progressive expenditure tax is introduced as a source of revenue on public pension and tax systems. When 
dealing with the pension reform case in which the earnings-related pension is abolished, this paper takes account 
of a transition relief for the generations that have paid contributions.
　The simulation results predict long-run increases in output when the public pension system consists of only 
the basic pension, which is ﬁnanced by a consumption tax. This is because the substitution from contributions 
(which mean a proportional labor income tax) to a proportional consumption tax greatly stimulates capital 
accumulation. Furthermore, the results show that the introduction of a progressive expenditure (or consumption) 
tax not only may promote economic growth substantially but also may mitigate intragenerational inequality 
efﬁciently.
　It is certain that these reforms substantially enhance the welfare of many generations, but badly deteriorate the 
welfare for the generations born in around 1960s in the transition process of the reforms. A change from a labor 
income tax to a consumption tax creates income transfers among generations during the transition. At the onset 
of policy reform, the elderly who had already paid their labor income tax have to pay an additional consumption 
tax. Because these generations suffer from a double burden, the transition to a consumption tax is not Pareto 
improving. Although the shift to a consumption tax may ultimately improve the welfare for many (especially, 
future) generations, the conclusion that recommends a consumption tax will be required to provide further 
justiﬁcation, that is, to suggest measures to avoid a double burden during the transition. One of the solutions to 
this problem may be to consider the transfer from the future generations that are substantially better off to the 
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generations that suffer from a double burden, through public debts.
Appendix A: Utility maximization problem
　The utility maximization problem over time for each income class in Section 2 is regarded as the 
maximization of  Ut, i  in equation (2) subject to equations (3) and (8). Let the Lagrange function be
　　　
　　　　　  (A1)
where  λt, is   and  η
t, i
s   represent the Lagrange multiplier for equations (3) and (8), respectively.
　The ﬁrst-order conditions on consumption  Ct, is , leisure  l
t, i
s , and assets  A
t, i
s+1  for  s = 21, 22, ..., 95  can be 
expressed by
　　　  (A2)
　　　
　　　
 　　(A3)
　　　  (A4)
　　　  (A5)
　　　  (A6)
　　　  (A7)
　The combination of equations (A2) and (A4) produces equations (9) and (10). If the initial value,  Vt, i21 , is 
specified, the value of each age,  Vt, is , can be derived from equation (9). If  V
 i
s  is specified, the values of 
consumption,  C is  , and leisure,  l
i
s , at each age are obtained in the method that follows.
　For  S=21, 22, ..., RHi, the combination of equations (A2) and (A3) yields the following expression:
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　　　   (A8)
　If the value of  l t, is   is given under  η
t, i
s = 0, the value of  C
t, i
s   can be obtained using a numerical method, and 
then the value of  Vt, is   can be derived from equation (10). The value of  l
t, i
s   is chosen so that the value of  V
t, i
s  
obtained in the simulation is the closest to that calculated by evolution from  Vt, i21   through equation (9). If the 
value of  l t, is   chosen is unity or higher, the value of  C
t, i
s   is obtained from equation (10) under  l
t, i
s =1. If it is 
less than unity, the value of  Ct, is   is derived from equation (A8).
　For  s = REt+1,  REt  + 2, ..., 95,  the condition of  l t, is = 1  leads to the following equation:
　　　  (10)’
　The value of  Ct, is   is chosen to satisfy this equation.
Appendix B: Introduction of Progressive Expenditure Taxation
　The simulation results suggest that a progressive expenditure tax is ultimately an ideal tax regime in terms of 
efﬁciency and equity. However, a sudden move from the current Japanese tax system (that depends mainly on 
a progressive income tax) to a progressive expenditure tax, would generate a substantial transition cost. With 
regard to a short-term policy, we should rely more on a consumption tax as a transition process, and execute a 
gradual shift towards a progressive expenditure tax.
　Nowadays, the number and variety of ﬁnancial transactions that occur by Internet trading are progressing on 
a global scale. Hence, it is becoming more and more difﬁcult to precisely monitor personal income. Levying a 
tax on expenditure, an ultimate purpose of economic activity, may solve this problem. Irrespective of a means to 
earn income, a tax ofﬁce may be able to collect taxes efﬁciently and equitably by taxation on expenditure.
　The amount of income of salaried workers can be precisely monitored by withholding tax at the income 
source. On the other hand, it is said that for self-employed persons or farm households, the ability to monitor 
income is substantially lower because of tax payment by self-assessment. An expenditure tax is likely to mitigate 
this state of unfairness between workers of different ﬁelds. Moreover, the introduction of tax progressivity to the 
total amount of expenditure may be desirable in terms of equity, because the range of tax base of expenditure 
would be wider than that of income.
　Finally, the main purpose of this study is to let many academic researchers or policy makers aware of this 
new type of tax regime (i.e., a progressive expenditure tax) and its merits. We believe that even if a progressive 
expenditure tax is not actually introduced in Japan, the policy implication obtained in our analysis will still 
be meaningful and effective. Even in the case of implementing structural reform along the lines of the current 
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Japanese tax system, knowledge of this new type of tax schedule will prove to be useful.
Appendix C: How Can Progressive Expenditure Taxation Be Implemented?
　The simulation results in this paper quantitatively suggest that a progressive expenditure tax substantially 
stimulates capital accumulation, and efﬁciently reduces within-cohort income inequality. We present the concrete 
measures of carrying out progressive expenditure taxation. Conceptually, it is easy to introduce progressive 
expenditure taxation. The feasibility of implementing progressive expenditure taxation, however, contains a 
serious problem in the real world: that is to measure and grasp the ﬁgures of each individual’s expenditure. For 
its implementation, it is necessary to grasp the total amount of annual expenditure for each household. This 
implies that a tax authority has to grasp the whole picture of consumption activities of each individual in detail. 
How can we measure a tax base that is deﬁned by expenditure? We propose that it is feasible to measure it with 
the method that follows.
　There is a relation that states income is equal to consumption (or expenditure) plus savings. If the amounts 
of both income and savings are available for each individual, the balance is equal to the amount of expenditure. 
The income ﬁgure is efﬁciently obtained using the current Japanese system of withholding taxes at the income 
source. The savings ﬁgure can be obtained through the self-assessment system. It should be emphasized that the 
self-assessment of savings is the exact opposite to that of income in terms of an individual incentive. The more 
an individual declares savings, the lower tax rates on expenditure the individual has. This is entirely in contrast 
to the case of the self-assessment of income.
　The savings figure can be consolidated using an electronic financial system. All financial institutions are 
requested to report the total amount of ﬁnancial assets held by each individual with an individual tax number 
(or a social security number) to a tax office. Thus, the tax office is able to grasp the overall wealth of each 
individual. Of course, this feasibility depends solely on the development of a computer-based ﬁnancial system.
　To introduce a progressive expenditure tax, it is necessary that the tax ofﬁce can grasp the total amount of 
expenditure for each individual or household. At present, computer technology is making remarkably rapid 
progress and over time will be able to provide a better environment for the introduction of a progressive 
expenditure tax in Japan. Thus, the possibility of introducing the tax regime should steadily increase.
　The justiﬁcation for introducing a taxpayer identiﬁcation number system is presently being actively discussed 
in Japan. This system has already been adopted in the United States, Canada, and in Scandinavian countries. In 
this system, each taxpayer has an identiﬁcation number (a tax number or a social security number) that enables a 
tax agency to monitor the total amounts of income and assets. Not only would this system help the introduction 
of a progressive expenditure tax, it is also necessary to efﬁciently and equitably provide public services for the 
elderly. Thus, it may not be long before a progressive expenditure tax is introduced in Japan.
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Notes
1  Altig et al. (2001) dealt with differences of lifetime earnings ability by incorporating 12 lifetime-income 
groups into a life-cycle model. Furthermore, Okamoto (2005b) introduced numerous representative 
households with continuous income distribution in each cohort. On the other hand, Uemura (2001) and Ihori 
et al. (2006) analyze using a life-cycle model with a single representative household.
2  See Seidman (1997) and Okamoto (2004, 2005a) for the details of a progressive expenditure (or 
consumption) tax. Kaldor (1955) claims that the implicit taxation of individuals with vast inherited wealth via 
an expenditure tax is a ﬁnal goal.
3  Okamoto and Tachibanaki (2002) also included the ﬂat basic pension in the public pension program. In that 
study, general tax revenue covered one third of the basic pension in the benchmark simulation, and the rate 
of tax transfer was raised from one third to a half (i.e., there is a rise in the basic pension by one sixth). That 
study examined the effects of an increase in the tax transfer on efﬁciency and equity.
4  With regard to simulation cases except for the benchmark, strictly speaking, the total amount of basic pension 
or that of public pension is not ﬁnanced completely by a consumption tax. This is because there exists the part 
originally covered by the general tax revenue, namely, a little more than one third of basic pension currently 
ﬁnanced by general taxes. However, we can interpret that, in those cases, this part of basic pension is ﬁnanced 
not by the general tax revenue but by a consumption tax. Therefore, we can regard that the whole basic 
pension or the overall public pension is ﬁnanced by a consumption tax in those cases.
5  According to Okamoto (2010), which analyzes in the steady state, if we consider a public pension program 
with the same scale as the current Japanese program, the highest level of social welfare is attained when 
a public pension system consists of only a basic pension and is ﬁnanced by a consumption tax. Thus, we 
consider the case in which the overall public pension consists of only a basic pension and is ﬁnanced by a 
consumption tax, namely, Case C.
6  The tax rate on capital income is assigned the same value as in Braun et al. (2005, 2009). The tax rate on 
bequests is assigned making reference to Ihori et al. (2006).
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